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In this paper, after discussing the theoretical underpinnings of unconventional 
monetary policy measures, we review the existing empirical evidence on their effectiveness, 
focusing on those adopted by the European Central Bank and by the Federal Reserve. These 
measures operate in two ways: through the signalling channel and through the portfolio-
balance channel. In the former, the central bank can use communication to steer interest rates 
and to restore confidence in the financial markets; the latter hinges on the hypothesis of 
imperfect substitutability of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet of the private sector 
and postulates that the central bank’s asset purchases and liquidity provision lower financial 
yields and improve funding conditions. The review of the empirical literature suggests that 
the unconventional measures were effective and that their impact on the economy was 
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In normal times central banks implement monetary policy by steering official interest 
rates and explaining to the public how a particular monetary stance in a given economic 
environment should contribute to achieving the final goals. To this purpose, central banks may 
decide to share with the public their views about the future evolution of some key 
macroeconomic variables or even their policy intentions. 
Monetary policy decisions and announcements are first transmitted to the interbank 
market (the market for central bank reserves). When market conditions are quiet, central banks’ 
monopolistic power in the provision of reserves allows them to steer interest rates in the 
interbank market very accurately.  
In such an environment the provision of liquidity to the banking system is a mechanical 
exercise and liquidity management operations are designed exclusively to implement the desired 
level of short-term interest rates. In particular, the provision of liquidity does not contain any 
information about the monetary policy stance beyond that included in the official interest rate.
1 
Moreover, during normal times the central bank only cares about injecting the banking system 
with the appropriate amount of reserves while their distribution among depository institutions 
takes place endogenously through the interbank market. 
The monetary impulse is then transmitted through different channels to all the other 
financial markets.
2 In particular, it also affects credit market conditions and long-term interest 
rates, which are key elements in the public’s investment-consumption decisions. Through this 
transmission mechanism the central bank can therefore pursue its final objectives in terms of 
inflation and possibly growth. 
During a financial crisis implementing monetary policy is a much more complex 
exercise as the transmission mechanism can be severely impaired by disruptions in the financial 
markets. First of all, the increase in the volatility of the demand for reserves and the limited 
redistribution of liquidity among depository institutions may adversely affect the central bank’s 
ability to control short-term interest rates in the interbank market. Second, disruptions in other 
segments of the financial market may hamper the transmission of the monetary impulse across 
the full spectrum of financial assets. Finally, when the effect of the crisis on the real economy is 
large, the zero lower bound for interest rates may become a binding constraint for monetary 
policy decisions.
3 In these situations central banks may need to resort to unconventional 
measures to regain control on the economy.  
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1 This independence between policy decisions and liquidity provision is called the “separation” or “decoupling” 
principle (Borio and Disyatat 2010). 
2 Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Mishkin (1996), Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan, Jansen (2008) and Boivin, 
Kiley and Mishkin (2010). 
3 “The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates limits the ability of central banks to reduce short-term interest 
rates. As a result, when nominal interest rates are near zero, central banks are unable to use further reductions in 
short-term interest rates to provide additional stimulus to the economy and check unwelcome disinflation”, Chung 
et al. (2011).   6
There is not a universally accepted definition of a non-standard monetary policy 
measure: as Borio and Disyatat (2010) observe, the difference between a conventional and an 
unconventional tool might, in some cases, be very tenuous.
4 In this paper we adopt a very broad 
characterization and we include in the set of unconventional measures any policy intervention 
that aims to rectify a malfunctioning of the monetary transmission mechanism or to provide 
further stimulus to the economy when the official interest rates reach the zero bound. We 
therefore classify as non-standard tools all the measures implemented during the global financial 
crisis that addressed liquidity shortages both of depository institutions and of other important 
segments of the financial market, the direct purchase of private and public securities, and the 
adoption of particular forms of communication designed to restore a more normal functioning of 
the markets and influence expectations about future official interest rates. 
During the global financial crisis recourse to these measures was heterogeneous across 
countries. This reflected differences in the structure of the respective financial systems and in 
the severity of market disruptions, as well as the role of central banks’ judgment. During 
unconventional times this last factor contributes more because of the lack of sound theory and 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of non-standard measures (Trichet 2010). To fill this 
gap, and to equip policy makers with sounder evaluation instruments, the profession has recently 
devoted considerable effort to improving formal understanding of the mechanisms through 
which unconventional monetary measures influence the economy and to testing for their 
empirical relevance. This strand of literature has grown rapidly and is now sufficiently large to 
allow some conclusions to be drawn.  
In this paper, we describe the various measures adopted in the US and in the euro area 
during the recent crisis, we provide a review of the main theoretical underpinnings that support 
the use of unconventional measures in the case of financial distress, and we survey the evidence 
on their effectiveness. While there is no doubt that these measures prevented a collapse of the 
financial system and a deeper contraction of the real economy as a result of the global crisis, a 
clearer understanding of the contribution of each, from both a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective, is a necessary step towards defining an “optimal unconventional tool-box”.  
In the review of the theoretical literature on the functioning of unconventional measures 
we identify two channels of transmission.  
The first is the signalling channel, which enables the central bank to use communication 
to restore confidence in the markets and influence private expectations about future policy 
decisions. This channel may be particularly useful when official interest rates reach the zero 
lower bound and the central bank needs to provide further stimulus to the economy.  
The purchase of public and private securities and the provision of credit to financial and 
non-financial institutions affect the economy through the portfolio-balance channel, which 
operates when assets and liabilities in the balance sheets of the private sector are imperfectly 
substitutable. The central bank can exploit this channel when it wants to alleviate tensions in 
particular segments of the financial markets, when it seeks to reduce yields more widely, and 
when it decides to counteract the impact of financial frictions on funding conditions. 
In the review of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of unconventional measures 
we focus on the euro area and on the US as the analysis of these two areas allows us to review a 
broad spectrum of unconventional measures ranging from the bank-oriented decisions adopted 
                                                 
4 While the adoption of a new monetary policy tool is certainly an unconventional measure, it is less clear whether 
more frequent and more intense use of a standard tool can be classified as a conventional or as an unconventional 
measure, especially when it is used for non-standard purposes.   7
in the euro area to the more market-oriented actions implemented on the other side of the 
Atlantic.  
The choice of a classification scheme for unconventional measures displays the same 
degree of arbitrariness as the division of monetary measures into conventional and 
unconventional. This is reflected in the abundance of taxonomies currently available in the 
literature.
5 In this paper we classify the available empirical studies according to whether they 
examine the impact of non-traditional tools (i) on financial variables or (ii) on macroeconomic 
variables, and according to the methodology followed in the empirical investigation.  
All in all, this review suggests that the unconventional measures adopted on both sides of 
the Atlantic were so far effective in influencing financial and macroeconomic variables. 
However, considerable uncertainty surrounds the quantification of these effects. Moreover, an 
important issue, only mentioned at the end of the paper, concerns the potential costs to central 
banks of reversing such measures and their possible impact on private banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour (moral hazard).
6 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief chronological description of 
the unconventional measures adopted in the US and in the euro area up to mid-2011. Section 3 
analyses the theoretical support for their effectiveness. Section 4 surveys the empirical evidence 
and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Description of central banks’ interventions during the financial crisis 
In this section we present the unconventional tools adopted by the Fed and the ECB 
during the global financial crisis, up to mid-2011.
7 We provide two types of complementary 
information. In the text we mostly focus on the rationale behind each specific measure, on the 
description of the particular market conditions that led to its adoption, and on how each of these 
measures was expected to restore a more normal functioning of the monetary transmission 
mechanism and/or to provide further stimulus to the economy. In addition, in Tables 1 and 2 we 
describe in detail the main characteristics of each unconventional tool adopted, respectively, by 
the Fed and the ECB (inception and duration of the programme, maximum and average impact 
on the central bank’s balance sheet, eligible counterparties, collateral, etc.). We first describe the 
measures adopted at the beginning of the crisis (August 2007 – September 2008) and then the 





                                                 
5 Stone, Fujita and Ishi (2011), for example, suggest a classification based on whether the final objective of the 
unconventional operation is one of financial or macroeconomic stability; Borio and Disyatat (2011) propose a 
taxonomy based on the particular financial market targeted by the unconventional operations and on their impact on 
the private sector’s balance sheets; Bini Smaghi (2009) classifies unconventional measures into “endogenous credit 
easing” – measures designed to provide abundant liquidity to commercial banks – “credit easing” – measures to 
address liquidity shortages and counter spreads in other dysfunctional segments of the financial market – and 
“quantitative easing” – purchases of government bonds to reduce long-term risk-free rates; Bernanke (2009) adopts 
a similar taxonomy. 
6 Some remarks on the challenges and risks of reversing unconventional monetary policy are discussed in Buiter 
(2010) and Borio and Disyatat (2010). 
7 We do not consider here other important economies. Stone, Fujita and Ishi (2011) provide an exhaustive 
description of the main unconventional monetary measures adopted both in advanced and in emerging countries.   8
Measures adopted by the Fed in the pre-Lehman phase (August 2007-September 2008) 
The first phase of the crisis featured a significantly higher volatility of banks’ liquidity 
demand, a heightened preference for long-term liquidity and severe impairments in the 
redistribution of funds in the interbank market. During this period the unconventional measures 
adopted by the Fed and the ECB aimed to prevent disorders in money markets hampering the 
monetary transmission mechanism, but both central banks sterilized the impact of their actions 
on the monetary base in order to keep overnight interest rates in line with their targets (Figure 
1). 
In the US, where reserves are normally channelled to the banking system through a small 
group of primary dealers, the Fed implemented a series of measures to extend the availability of 
emergency and long-term funding to both these intermediaries and depository institutions.
8  
Figure 1: Official and short-term interest rates in the US and in the euro area 
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With the adoption of the Term Discount Window Program (TDWP; Table 1, column 1) 
the Fed progressively extended the maximum maturity of emergency loans available to 
depository institutions through the Discount Window and diminished the discount rate premium 
charged on this facility. The Term Auction Facility (TAF; Table 1, column 2) pursued a similar 
objective by providing collateralized long-term liquidity to depository institutions and 
supporting the redistribution of funds in the interbank market.
9 However, under the TAF the Fed 
auctioned term funds to banks to minimize the risk that depository institutions could be 
discouraged from requesting funds because of “stigma” issues. While use of the TDWP was 
generally limited, possibly owing to the associated perceived stigma, the TAF turned out to be 
an important channel of liquidity provision (Figure 2). Recourse to it reached a peak of around 
$500 billion after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
                                                 
8 The Fed manages its balance sheet so as to maintain the permanent liquidity deficit of the banking system very 
low and satisfies it, so to keep the effective fed fund rate in line with its target, through short term repo operations 
implemented with a small group of primary dealers. In the US this operational framework was considered to be 
more efficient than one based on a direct relation between the central bank and each depository institution. In 
normal times primary dealers do not have access to emergency funding. 
9 The collateral that is eligible in the TAF programme is the same as in the Discount Window Facility.   9 
 
Table 1: Unconventional measures adopted by the Federal Reserve (August 2007 – September 2011)  

















































Announcement date  Aug. 17, 2007  Dec. 12, 2007  Dec. 12, 2007  Mar. 11, 2008  Mar. 11, 2008  Mar. 16, 2008  Sept. 19, 2008  Oct. 7, 2008  Nov. 25, 2008  Nov. 25, 2008  Mar. 18, 2009 
Start date  Aug. 17, 2007  Dec. 17, 2007  -  Mar. 27, 2008  Mar. 27, 2008  Mar. 17, 2008  Sept. 22, 2008  Oct. 27, 2008  Mar. 17, 2009  Jan. 5, 2009  Mar. 25, 2009 
End date  Mar. 18, 2010 
(2)  Mar. 8, 2010  -  Feb. 1, 2010  Dec. 30, 2008  Feb. 1, 2010  Feb. 1, 2010  Feb. 1, 2010  Jun. 30, 2010
(4)  Mar. 31, 2010  Jun. 30, 2011
(5) 
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Frequency   Standing facility 
Every other 



















Average impact on Fed 
balance sheet 
(1)  $29 bn
(3)  $206 bn   $90 bn   $80 bn  approx $80 bn.  $19 bn   $21 bn  $147 bn   $36 bn 
$107 bn (Agency 
debt), 




Max impact on Fed 
balance sheet 
(1)  $112 bn
(3)  $493 bn   $583 bn   $234 bn  $80 bn  $148 bn  $146 bn  $350 bn  $48 bn 
$169 bn (Agency 
debt), 









































Reduce costs and 
increase 
availability of 
credit for housing 
Reduce term 
premia in the 
long-term 
interest rates 
Sources: Forms of Federal Reserve Lending, Federal Reserve New York; Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, Board of Governors; Federal Reserve statistical release, H.4.1, Factors affecting reserve balances, 
Tables 1-8, Board of Governors. Notes: (1) Descriptive statistics computed on weekly averages over the life of the programme. (2) On February 18, 2010, the Federal Reserve announced that the typical maximum maturity on primary 
credit would be shortened to overnight, effective March 18, 2010. (3) Statistics computed on total primary credit. (4) On that date the facility was closed for new loan extensions against newly issued commercial mortgage-backed 
securities. (5) On September, 21th, 2011 the FOMC has announced the intention to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with maturity between 6 and 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury 
securities with maturities of 3 years or less. (6) Purchases of US Treasury securities since March 25, 2009. Starting from August 11, 2010 it includes Treasuries purchases from the reinvestment of principal payments on Agency debt 
and Agency MBS. On September, 21th, 2011 the FOMC has announced the intention to reinvest principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities.   10
Figure 2: Unconventional measures adopted by the Fed in the pre-Lehman phase 
 
In order to satisfy the exceptional needs for US dollar funding by foreign banks the Fed 
provided dollars to foreign central banks by means of temporary Reciprocal Currency 
Agreements (RCA; Table 1, column 3). These central banks, in turn, offered US dollar liquidity 
to their respective banking systems. Moreover, to alleviate pressures in the secured funding 
market the Fed also started the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF; Table 1, column 4) 
with which it lent US Treasuries to primary dealers against a wide range of less liquid 
securities.
10 Finally, with the Single-Tranche OMO Program (Table 1, column 5) and with the 
Primary Dealers Credit Facility (PDCF; Table 1, column 6) the Fed provided, respectively, 
emergency and long-term liquidity to primary dealers.
11  
Measures adopted by the ECB in the pre-Lehman phase (August 2007 – September 2008) 
The ECB also implemented exceptional measures to fight back against the initial effects 
of the crisis. However, unlike the Fed, it was able to counteract shocks to the distribution of 
reserves in the banking system within its standard operational framework. This was due to two 
reasons: first, the ECB manages its balance sheet so as to keep a large permanent liquidity 
deficit;
12 second, all depository institutions of the euro area have direct access to central bank’s 
liquidity.
13  
The ECB accommodated banks’ heightened preference for long-term funding 
straightforwardly by increasing the frequency and the liquidity allotted in its long-term 
refinancing operations (Figure 3).
14 Moreover, to counteract the excessive volatility of the 
overnight rate (Eonia) within the maintenance period, it satisfied banks’ preference for early 
fulfilment of the reserve requirements (front-loading) by providing a relatively larger volume of 
funds in the first part of the maintenance period. Finally, the increased volatility in liquidity 
demand and the larger demand for US dollars were offset, respectively, by greater recourse to 
fine-tuning operations (Table 2, column 1) and through auctions of US dollar liquidity, available 
from the Fed Reciprocal Currency Agreements  (Table 2, column 2).  
                                                 
10 The Fed offers securities for loan from the SOMA portfolio also in normal times. This “standard” securities 
lending programme is collateralized with Treasuries and is conducted on an overnight basis. 
11 The PDCF was intended to be a backstop facility. The credit extended through this facility was charged with a 
penalty rate and subject to a frequency-based fee after 45 days of use. 
12 The ECB satisfies this liquidity deficit through main and long-term refinancing operations. These operations are 
collateralized loans with maturities of one week and three months. Before the crisis the relative weight of these two 
operations was approximately two thirds and one third. 
13 Currently, about 2200 credit institutions have access to the Eurosystem refinancing operations. 
14 The impact of the more abundant provision of long-term funding on the total amount of reserves provided to the 
banking system was offset by a reduced supply of reserves in the main refinancing operations.   11
The adoption of these measures was supplemented by a significant effort of 
communication aimed at maintaining a clear separation between monetary policy decisions and 
liquidity provision operations (the “separation principle”). To counteract the renewed volatility 
of the Eonia and the increase in money market spreads that followed the collapse of Bear 
Stearns in March 2008, the ECB introduced supplementary long-term operations (Table 2, 
column 3) with a maturity of six months. 
Figure 3: Unconventional measures adopted by the ECB in the pre-Lehman phase 
 
 
Measures adopted by the Fed in the post-Lehman phase (September 2008- onward) 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 the financial crisis became 
more severe and spread to the shadow banking system. In the US it quickly became clear that 
the provision of funds and high-quality securities to depository institutions and primary dealers 
would not be sufficient to avert a collapse of the financial system. The liquidity in critical non-
bank markets evaporated and financial spreads reached unprecedented levels. To address these 
issues the Fed enhanced the non-standard measures adopted before Lehman’s bankruptcy and 
implemented a series of new unconventional tools.  
To understand the crucial role of this new set of measures it is useful to start with a 
stylized description of the functioning of the US financial system on the eve of the financial 
crisis. Under a standard banking system, banks generate loans using deposits or longer-term 
liabilities and hold them to maturity in their balance sheets. Given their crucial role in the 
economy, these institutions have direct access to central bank liquidity, enjoy government 
guarantees, but are also subject to a strict regulation that limits their balance-sheet exposure to 
credit and liquidity risks. 
In the years before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the credit provision function was 
progressively moved into an unregulated shadow banking system where financial institutions 
made large profits by increasing the leverage of their business well above the limits permitted in 
the traditional system.
15 This alternative banking system is populated by a very heterogeneous 
group of financial institutions that are strictly interconnected and that conduct maturity, credit 
and liquidity transformation through a wide range of secured funding techniques such as asset-
backed commercial papers (ABCP), asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO) and repos.
16  
 
                                                 
15 See Gorton (2010) and Pozsar et al. (2010). 
16 The shadow banking system includes special investment vehicles (SIVs), special purpose vehicles (SPVs), 
money market funds, hedge funds, monolines, investment banks, and many other non-bank financial institutions.   12 
 
Table 2: Unconventional measures adopted by the ECB (August 2007 – September 2011)  

























Announcement date  Quick tender  Dec. 12, 2007  Mar. 27, 2008  Sep. 29 2008  Oct. 9-15, 2008  May 7, 2009  May 7, 2009  May 9, 2010 
Start date 
Facility already 
existing in the 
ECB operational 
framework 
Dec. 17, 2007  Mar. 28, 2008  Sept. 30, 2008  Oct. 15, 2008  Jun. 24, 2009  Jun. 4, 2009  May 14, 2010 
End date  -  Ongoing  May 12, 2010 
(3) (4)  Ongoing  Ongoing  Dec. 16, 2009 
(3)  Jun. 30, 2010  Ongoing 
Participants 
All banks that 
have access to 
Eurosystem 
credit operations 
All banks that have 
access to Eurosystem 
credit operations 
All banks that have 
access to Eurosystem 
credit operations 
All banks that have 
access to Eurosystem 
credit operations 
All banks that have 
access to Eurosystem 
credit operations 
All banks that have 
access to Eurosystem 
credit operations 
All banks that have 
access to Eurosystem 
credit operations and 
euro-area based 
counterparties used 
by the Eurosystem 
for the investment of 
its euro-denominated 
portfolios 
All banks that have access to 
Eurosystem credit operations  
and euro-area based 
counterparties used by the 
Eurosystem for the investment 
of its euro-denominated 
portfolios 
What are they 
borrowing?  Funds 
Funds in US dollars, 
Swiss francs and 
pound sterlings 






Collateral eligible for 
Eurosystem credit 
operations 
Collateral eligible for 
Eurosystem credit 
operations 
Collateral eligible for 
Eurosystem credit 
operations 
Collateral eligible for 
Eurosystem credit 
operations (expanded 
as of decision of 15 
Oct. 2008) 
Collateral eligible for 
Eurosystem credit 
operations (expanded 
as of decision of 15 
Oct. 2008) 
_ _ 
Term of the loan  From overnight 
to 5 days  7, 28, 35 and 84 days  6 months 
Same as the length of 
the maintenance 
period for the banks' 
reserve requirement 
1 week, 1, 3, 6 and 
12 months  1 year 
Outright purchases in 
the primary and 
secondary markets 
Outright purchases in the 
secondary market 
Frequency of the program  As necessary 
(auction) 
In connection with 




Once at the 
beginning of each 
maintenance period 
_ 









-   € 62 bn 
(2)  € 66 bn
(4)  € 58 bn  _  € 417 bn  € 31 bn  € 71 bn 





-  € 249 bn 
(2)  € 155 bn
(4)  € 135 bn  _  € 614 bn  € 61 bn  € 157 bn  
Objective 
Assure orderly 
conditions in the 
euro money 
market 
Assure liquidity in 
foreign currencies to 
euro-area banks 
Support the 
normalisation of the 
functioning of the 
euro money market. 
Improve the overall 
liquidity position of 
the euro-area 
banking system 
Assure the provision 
of liquidity to all 
euro-area banks 
Encourage the 
provision of credit by 
banks to the private 
sector 
Restore the covered 
bonds market 
segment 
Address the malfunctioning of 
securities markets and restore 
the monetary transmission 
mechanism 
Sources: ECB Weekly Financial Statements; ECB Statistical Data Warehouse Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet.  
Notes: (1) Descriptive statistics computed on weekly averages over the life of the programme. (2) Data from the balance-sheet item Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency which includes US swaps. 
(3) Date at which the last operations has been conducted. (4) A 6-month operation was reactivated on August, 10
th, 2011. Descriptive statistics presented in the table do not take into account the impact of this operation on 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet.   13
The fundamental weakness of this system, which had neither deposit guarantees nor 
direct access to central bank liquidity, and its exposure to the same type of bank runs that 
devastated the traditional banking system during the Great Depression, became apparent when 
in September 2008 the net asset value of some important money market funds fell below the 
target value of one dollar per share and these funds received massive requests for redemptions.
17 
The strict interconnections among the different segments of the shadow banking system 
accelerated the transmission of the crisis and quickly affected the prices and the liquidity of 
other important instruments of this market (ABCP, ABS, CDO, etc). The existence of liquidity 
provision agreements between the institutions of the traditional and the shadow banking system 
suddenly also exposed the former to a strong liquidity shortage. In essence, the entire financial 
system of the US came very close to collapse.  
With the unconventional measures adopted since mid-September 2008 the Fed has 
greatly extended the provision of temporary liquidity to the most important part of the shadow 
banking system. This was done (mainly) through three programmes.  
With the ABCP Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF; Table 1, column 7) the 
Fed provided short-term loans to depository institutions to finance purchases of high-quality 
ABCP from money market mutual funds, thus sustaining their prices by avoiding fire sales. A 
similar objective was pursued with the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF; Table 1, 
column 8), which provided a temporary liquidity backstop to issuers of commercial paper and 
was intended, in particular, to reduce investors’ and borrowers’ concerns about “roll-over risk” 
(Figure 4, left panel).  
In contrast, the objective of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF; 
Table 1, column 9) was to substitute public for private balance-sheet capacity in a period in 
which there were serious risks of a credit crunch owing to sharp deleveraging and high risk 
aversion. With this programme the Fed provided investors with long-term loans (3 to 5 years) 
for the purchase of newly issued triple-A rated ABS backed by consumer and small business 
loans. The facility was subsequently expanded to include newly issued highly rated commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).  
Observing the widening of the spreads on GSE debt and on GSE-guaranteed mortgages, 
in November 2008 the Fed announced a programme of asset purchases of up to $100 billion in 
Agency debt and up to $500 billion in Agency MBS (Table 1, column 10)  to support the 
functioning of credit markets for housing. This decision aimed to reduce the cost and increase 
the availability of credit for house purchases. This, in turn, was expected to support the housing 
markets and improve conditions in the financial markets more generally.  
In the first part of 2009, faced with a further weakening of the economy and a still 
gloomy outlook for the housing and mortgage markets, the Fed expanded its asset purchase 
programme, increasing the target of purchases of Agency debt and Agency MBS to $200 billion 
and $1.25 trillion respectively.  
Moreover, to improve conditions in private credit markets, it also announced the 
intention to purchase up to $300 billion of long-term Treasury securities (the so-called QE1; 
Table 1, column 11) over the following six months.
18 To support the economic recovery, in 
August 2010, the Fed decided to keep its total holdings of securities constant by reinvesting 
principal payments from Agency debt and MBS in long-term Treasury securities and to roll over 
                                                 
17 A Money market fund investor typically expects to get back one dollar for every dollar invested, plus any interest 
or dividend earned by the fund. 
18 Sometimes QE1 is used also to refer to the purchase programme of MBS and agency debt that was expanded in 
March 2009 at the same time as the start of purchases of long-term Treasuries was announced. Throughout, we 
make a distinction between types of assets purchased according to the main objectives of the purchases.   14
the holdings of Treasury securities as they matured. Faced with the slow recovery of output and 
employment, on November 2010 the Fed announced a further expansion of its balance sheet by 
purchasing a further $600 billion of long-term Treasury securities (the QE2). 
These large-scale asset purchase programmes were adopted mainly at the point in which 
the federal funds rate had effectively reached the zero lower bound. In fact, in December 2008 
the Fed lowered its official rate to a range between 0 and 0.25 per cent. Since then, the Fed has 
been providing forward guidance about the likely path of the Federal funds rate.
19 The Federal 
Open Market Committee meeting statement noted that “economic conditions are likely to 
warrant an exceptionally low level of the federal funds rate for some times”. Since March 2009 
the expression “for some time” has been replaced with “for an extended period” and in August 
2011 it has announced that “economic conditions - including low rates of resource utilization 
and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run - are likely to warrant exceptionally 
low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013”. 
The new set of unconventional measures adopted after the collapse of Lehman and the 
extension of those introduced in the first phase of the crisis caused a sharp increase in the size of 
the Fed’s balance sheet, which soared from around $1 trillion at the beginning of September 
2008 to more than $2 trillion by the end of the same year. In the same period the reserve 
balances of depository institutions increased from around $10 billion to more than $800 billion 
(Figure 4, right panel). This sharp increase in reserves pushed the effective federal funds rate 
well below its target (Figure 1). 
Figure 4: Main unconventional measures adopted by the Fed 
Fed’s balance sheet: asset side 
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Measures adopted by the ECB in the post-Lehman phase (September 2008 - onward) 
With the deepening of the financial crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
interventions of the ECB also became bolder. Official rates were cut by 325 basis points 
between October 2008 and May 2009, to the historically low level of 1 per cent (Figure 1). At 
the same time, unconventional measures increased in size and scope, while continuing to operate 
mainly through the banking sector. 
In October 2008, the ECB decided to conduct all its refinancing operations with fixed 
rate tenders and full allotment (FRFA; Table 2, column 5). Those procedures made the 
provision of liquidity to the banks unlimited (the availability of collateral being the only 
constraint) and led to a considerable increase in the central bank’s balance sheet (Figure 3). The 
                                                 
19 It is arguable whether communication of the likely future path of interest rates is a truly unconventional measure 
of monetary policy given that some central banks have adopted this communication strategy in normal times. 
Notwithstanding, we include it because it has been one of the Fed’s monetary policy responses to the exceptional 
circumstances of the US economy and to the zero lower bound on short-term rates.   15
main objectives were to support the availability of credit to firms and households and to 
counteract the severe disruptions in the interbank market. To guarantee full access to the 
refinancing operations and to prevent fire sales of assets of lower quality, which would have 
accelerated the process of further deleveraging in the banks’ balance sheets, the ECB also 
decided to enlarge the set of assets accepted as eligible collateral in its refinancing operations.  
In addition, the ECB continued to provide liquidity in US dollars. In the weeks following 
the collapse of Lehman the contribution of these currency swaps rose to over 10 per cent of the 
size of the Eurosystem’s consolidated balance sheet (around €250 billion; Figure 5, left panel). 
The length of the refinancing operations was further increased in May 2009, when the 
ECB announced three 1-year FRFA refinancing operations (Table 2; column 6) to be held in 
June, September and December of the same year. The longer maturity of these operations was 
expected to restore the monetary transmission mechanism encouraging banks to provide credit 
to households and firms. In the first of these operations banks demanded an exceptional amount 
of liquidity (€442 billion; Figure 5, left panel). This implied a drop in the Eonia to levels close 
to the rate on the deposit facility (0.25 per cent; Figure 1) that was transmitted to all other 
money market rates. 
In May 2009 the ECB also decided to carry out a Covered Bonds Purchase Programme 
(CBPP; Table 2, column 7) to complement the liquidity management measures described above. 
The programme implied outright purchases, conducted in both the primary and the secondary 
market, of €60 billion of covered bonds issued by banks in the euro area, to be completed by 
June 2010. The aim of the CBPP was to revive this market segment, which had been particularly 
hard hit by the financial turbulence and had been one of the major sources of funds for banks 
before the crisis.  
Figure 5: Main unconventional measures adopted by the ECB 
ECB’s balance sheet: asset side  ECB: main and long-term refinancing operations  
(billions of euro) 
 
The financial crisis of 2007 had a considerable and persistent effect on public deficits. In 
the spring of 2010 the sustainability of the public finance of some euro area countries caught the 
attention of investors. The functioning of several segments of the financial markets and, in 
particular, of some government bond markets became seriously impaired. To address this 
problem and contrast potential spillovers to other sovereign issuers the Governing Council of 
the ECB decided to implement a program of purchase of euro area private and public securities 
(Securities Markets Programme, SMP; Table 2, column 8), focused on those market segments 
that were particularly dysfunctional. The objective of this unconventional measure was to 
support an appropriate functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism. The purchases 
were heavy during the first phase of the programme and at the beginning of 2011. From 
February to July 2011 interventions have been very limited. On 7 August 2011 the Governing   16
Council announced that it would again begin actively implementing the SMP. The decision was 
taken in view of the increased risk of some government debt markets becoming dysfunctional 
and tensions spreading to other markets in the absence of intervention (ECB (2011); Figure 6, 
left panel). Since then, substantial interventions were performed. This unconventional measure 
does not affect the monetary stance, since the ECB has been sterilizing its impact on the amount 
of outstanding liquidity through weekly fixed-term deposit operations (Figure 6, right panel).  
Figure 6: Securities Markets Programme and fixed-term deposits 
Securities Markets Programme  ECB’s balance sheet: liability side 
 
 
3. Unconventional monetary policy in theory 
In this section we describe two channels through which the unconventional monetary 
policy is transmitted to the economy: the signalling and the portfolio-balance channel.  
3.1 The signalling channel 
The signalling channel is activated through central bank’s communications informing the 
public about its intentions regarding the future evolution of short-term interest rates, the 
purchase of financial assets, or the implementation of other measures targeted at counteracting 
market dysfunctions. The efficacy of this channel relies on the credibility of the central bank and 
on the extent to which private expectations and confidence affect macroeconomic and financial 
market conditions. 
Not all forms of communication that exploit the signalling channel should be seen as 
“unconventional” measures. Since the 1990s it has become increasingly clear that managing 
expectations is a crucial task of monetary policy; therefore, communication aimed at sharing 
with the public central bank views about the macroeconomic outlook and, in some cases, about 
the future evolution of short-term interest rates has evolved into a standard tool of monetary 
policy.
20 Thus, communication should be considered an unconventional tool of monetary policy 
only when it is used by a central bank to convey information or pursue objectives that go beyond 
its standard practice.
21  
In the literature the signalling channel has been highlighted as the mechanism to escape 
the zero lower bound on official interest rates. Krugman (1998) claims that when the zero lower 
                                                 
20 An exhaustive analysis of the role of communication in monetary policy is provided by Blinder, Ehrmann, 
Fratzcher, de Haan and Jansen (2008); Ferrero and Secchi (2009 and 2010) analyse the effects and the desirability 
of communication of the future interest rate path in “normal” times. 
21 Note that according to this definition certain types of communication can be conventional for some central banks 
and unconventional for others. This is certainly the case with the announcement of future policy intentions, which is 
an unconventional tool for most central banks but a conventional measure for central banks such as the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank and the Swedish Riksbank.   17
bound binds, the central bank should follow an “irresponsibility principle”, that is, convince the 
market that it will allow prices to raise so to increase inflationary expectations. Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) embed this result in the New Keynesian (NK) framework concluding that not 
only is the signalling channel (or, as they call it, the management of expectations) crucial, but it 
is the only channel that is effective. In the NK model long-term interest rates, on which firms’ 
and households’ consumption, investment and borrowing decisions are based, depend entirely 
on financial market participants’ expectations about the future path of short-term rates.  
As mentioned, during the financial crisis the Fed provided forward guidance about the 
likely path of the federal funds rate to promote economic recovery and price stability (see 
Section 2). However, the central banks did not explicitly commit to the irresponsibility principle 
advocated by Krugman (1998) and announced that the future official interest rate path would 
depend on the evolution of the macroeconomic outlook.
22 Clarida (2010) argues that this type of 
commitment, if not properly qualified, may in practice be confused by the public with a policy 
of discretion (“policy rates are expected to be low because and so long as output and inflation 
are expected to be low”) which in case of perfect information is not expected to exert any 
influence on long-term interest rates. On the contrary, Walsh (2008) shows that, when the 
central bank is endowed with superior information, the provision of forward guidance about 
future interest rates is welfare-improving even when monetary policy is discretionary.   
Time inconsistency may severely limit the effectiveness of the announcement of an 
interest rate path: a change in the size and composition of its balance sheet may help to 
overcome this obstacle. For instance, large purchases of long-term securities may strengthen the 
promise to keep short-term rates low for some time owing to the adverse effect that an increase 
in official interest rates would have on the health of the central bank’s balance sheet (Bernanke, 
Reinhart and Sack 2004). The central bank could also enforce its commitment about future 
official interest rates by entering into more explicit contingent contracts with market 
participants. Tinsley (1998), for example, suggests that by selling short-horizon bond put 
options, the credibility of the central bank’s policy would be enforced by binding contractual 
arrangements with private sector agents, who will be compensated for any future deviations 
from the policy terms designated in the contingent contracts. 
The practical relevance of these mechanisms is questioned by Rudebusch (2011) who 
estimates that, notwithstanding its large bond purchases, the Fed’s losses due to an increase in 
short-term interest rates would be almost negligible. Moreover, these losses would only be 
realized on the share of the portfolio of long-term securities that is not held to maturity. These 
estimates and the fact that the central bank is not a private institution with profitability as its 
main objective suggest that the effectiveness of such a device in preventing short-term rate 
increases by the central bank is arguable.  
Communication aimed at reassuring markets on the central bank’s active role during 
episodes of financial turbulence can also help to restore the functioning of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. For example, the announcement of the intention to intervene in illiquid 
markets provides a signal to market participants that the central bank stands ready to contrast 
undue volatility in asset prices and provide liquidity in case of necessity. By assuring markets 
about the central bank’s role of lender of last resort and by providing an implicit guarantee of 
the intermediation role of the central bank, the announcement itself may influence market 
behaviour even before any action is taken.
23 The information released concerning the size, the 
                                                 
22 “The [Federal Open Market] Committee’s forward guidance has been framed not as an unconditional 
commitment to a specific federal funds rate path, but rather as an expectation that is explicitly contingent on 
economic conditions” Yellen (2011). 
23 Although it should be take into consideration that such an announcement may increase moral hazard and 
therefore contribute to risk-taking behaviour.   18
speed and, more in general, the terms of the intervention is crucial for the effectiveness of the 
signalling channel. The central bank’s optimal degree of transparency must trade off the 
credibility and effectiveness potentially gained with a very clear and transparent plan against the 
risks of providing inappropriate incentives to the market participants and of higher volatility due 
to not coming up to market expectations.  
3.2 The portfolio-balance channel 
The portfolio-balance channel is activated through central bank operations such as 
outright purchases of securities, asset swaps and liquidity injections, which modify the size and 
the composition of the balance sheet of both the central bank and the private sector. The central 
bank is the only economic player that can conduct this kind of intervention on a large scale 
since, in principle, it can expand its balance sheet indefinitely owing to its monopolistic power 
in the provision of monetary base.
24 
The central bank’s outright purchases and swap operations aim to influence prices in 
some specific dysfunctional segments of the financial market or to affect yields more widely. 
The latter is the case, for example, when the conventional monetary policy instrument is 
constrained at the zero lower bound and, to provide further stimulus to the economy, the central 
bank decides to purchase government bonds to reduce the returns on a wide range of financial 
assets. The efficacy of this channel hinges on the imperfect substitutability among private 
sector’s balance sheet items, which arises in the presence of economic frictions (e.g. asymmetric 
information, limited commitment and limited participation), and on the impact that changes in 
the supply of private assets and liabilities have on individual decisions.
25  
Imperfect substitutability on the asset side of the private sector balance sheet has been 
proposed by the preferred-habitat theory, first introduced by Modigliani and Sutch (1966) and 
recently included in a more formal model for the interest rate term structure by Vayanos and 
Vila (2009). According to the preferred habitat view, whenever there is a group of investors with 
preferences for specific maturities (typically long-term, as is the case of pension funds and life-
insurance companies), the net supply of securities at that maturity is a determinant of their 
yields. In this setup, changes in the net supply of assets of a given maturity by the central bank 
or government affect the yields of the assets. Moreover, when agents are heterogeneous, either 
because some of them are locked into their portfolio choices or because they have different 
degrees of risk-aversion (Ashcraft, Garleanu and Pedersen 2010) or different impatience to 
consume (Curdia and Woodford 2010), open market operations have distributional effects with 
potential influence on real activity and inflation.  
The items on the liability side of the private sector balance sheet also become imperfect 
substitutes when the economic environment is characterized by the presence of information 
asymmetries or limited commitment. In this situation external funds tend to be charged with an 
extra return (with respect to the opportunity cost of internally generated funds) which depends, 
in general, on the severity of the friction and on the quality of the borrower’s assets. In some 
cases external funds might even be rationed.
 26 During a financial crisis, when the health of the 
                                                 
24 The central bank is constrained in expanding its balance sheet only to the extent that this undermines its 
credibility. 
25 On the contrary central bank/government purchases are ineffective when financial assets are perfectly 
substitutable and changes in the composition of government’s portfolio do not involve distortionary changes in 
taxes. Wallace (1981), Eggertson and Woodford (2003). 
26 There is a vast literature on the role of financial frictions in shaping economic dynamics. According to the credit 
channel theory the presence of financial frictions amplifies the effects of monetary policy on the real economy 
through the effects that policy decisions have on the health of the balance sheet of private agents and, in turn, on the 
external premium. For a review of this literature see Bernanke and Gertler (1995). More recent analyses include   19
balance sheet deteriorates and confidence collapses, the extra return charged on external funds 
might become very large and lenders might be willing to provide funds only for very short 
periods of time.  
To avoid a collapse of credit availability the central bank can enhance its liquidity 
provision to depository institutions both to accommodate the increased demand for 
precautionary motive and to contrast the reduction in the circulation of reserves (Keister and Mc 
Andrews 2009; Freixas, Martin and Skeie 2009). To alleviate tensions associated with the 
liquidity mismatch between the asset and the liability side of private banks, it can also decide to 
provide liquidity for terms that are longer than normal. In this way the central bank sustains the 
provision of credit to the economy and reduces term spreads.   
However, a too prolonged recourse to these unconventional measures might create 
market distortions and increase significantly the central bank’s financial risk.
27,28 Christiano and 
Ikeda (2011) provide one caveat associated with the use of unconventional measures, arguing 
that their effectiveness might depend on the specific set of financial frictions that affect 
economic behaviour.
29 
4. Unconventional monetary policy in practice 
In this section we review the empirical literature on the effectiveness of the 
unconventional measures adopted by the Fed and the ECB. We classify the various studies 
according to whether they measure the impact of non-traditional tools (i) on financial variables 
or (ii) on macroeconomic variables.  
The first of these two groups, which is presented in Section 4.1, is further split into four 
sub-categories depending on whether the measure analysed was first implemented before or 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and on whether it was adopted by the Fed or by the 
ECB. A synthetic description of the methodology and of the main results of the various studies 
is reported in the tables at the end of each sub-section (Tables 3 to 5).
30 In Section 4.2 we review 
the evidence on the effects on macroeconomic variables with a summary description provided in 
Table 6 for both the US and the euro area.  
4.1 Effects of the unconventional measures on financial variables  
Effects of the measures adopted by the Fed in the pre-Lehman phase 
  The empirical literature on the effectiveness of unconventional measures adopted by the 
Fed before the bankruptcy of Lehman has mainly focused on the Term Auction Facility, on the 
Term Securities Lending Facility and on the Reciprocal Currency Agreements.
31  
There is no formal analysis of the other measures, namely the Term Discount Window 
Program, the Single-Tranche Open Market Program and the Primary Dealers Credit Facility. 
However, the heavy recourse to this group of facilities suggests that they were perceived by 
                                                                                                                                                            
Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), De Fiore and Tristani (2009), Demirel (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010). 
27 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) assume that unconventional monetary interventions entail some inefficiency cost. 
28 This risk is mitigated by the fact that central banks supply loans only against collateral. 
29 They argue that with moral hazard and hidden effort, the unconventional measures that have been used during the 
recent crisis (equity injections and credit provision to financial intermediaries) might not be effective in restoring an 
appropriate provision of credit to firms and households. 
30 In the tables we only include papers that use an econometric approach, while the studies based on more anecdotal 
approach are only commented in the text. 
31 See pages 5-7 and Table 1.   20
depository institutions and by primary dealers as effective in alleviating the significant funding 
tensions to which they were exposed during the crisis.
32 
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was intended to fight back against dysfunctionalities in 
the interbank market by providing collateralized long-term liquidity to depository institutions. 
Taylor and Williams (2010) assess its effectiveness by measuring the impact on the Libor-OIS 
spread. Their analysis is based on three hypotheses. First, the Libor-OIS spread is affected by a 
liquidity and a credit risk, which are independent of each other. Second, the credit risk can be 
approximated with measurable variables (CDS on financial institutions, Libor-Tibor spread, 
Libor-Repo spread). Third, the TAF may only influence the liquidity risk. Constructing on these 
assumptions they regress the Libor-OIS spread on different measures of credit risk and a dummy 
variable which is set to one on the days of announcement/implementation of the TAF. These 
regressions fail to find any significant impact of the TAF-dummies on the Libor-OIS spread and 
lead the authors to conclude against the effectiveness of this measure. 
McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) and Wu (2010) suggest that the baseline 
specification used by Taylor and Williams (2010) to measure the impact of the TAF might be 
inappropriate, particularly if the effect of this facility on the Libor-OIS spread is permanent. 
They propose two alternative approaches. McAndrews et al. (2008) substitute the dependent 
variable with the first difference of the Libor-OIS spread. Wu (2010) sets the TAF-dummy equal 
to zero before the announcement of the programme and to one thereafter.
33 Both analyses 
overturn the original result and find that the TAF reduced the 3-month Libor-OIS spread by 
around 50 basis points. The analysis of McAndrews et al. (2008) provides two further pieces of 
evidence. First, both the announcements concerning the programme and its actual 
implementation were effective in reducing liquidity risks. Moreover, it also turns out that both 
domestic and international TAF operations (currency swaps) provided a significant contribution 
in alleviating tensions in the interbank market. 
Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch (2009) analyse the effectiveness of the TAF using a 
six-factor arbitrage free representation of the term structures of risk-free (Treasuries) and risky 
interest rates (financial bonds and Libor).
34 This approach allows the authors to disentangle the 
liquidity risk component implicit in Libor rates and to verify whether the TAF was effective in 
contrasting its increase. The counterfactual exercise that is reported in the paper suggests that 
the TAF lowered the liquidity risk component of 3-month Libor rates by around 70 basis points 
over the period December 2007 to mid-2008.  
Thornton (2010) disputes this finding claiming that financial bonds and Libors are 
influenced by different credit risks. In particular, he argues that the narrowing of the Libor – 
financial bond spread observed after the implementation of this unconventional measure was not 
due to a reduction of liquidity premia in the interbank market but to an increase in the credit risk 
on financial bonds due to a more pessimistic view of the depth of the crisis.  
                                                 
32 Recourse to the Term Discount Window Facility and to the Primary Dealers Credit Facility reached a value close 
to $100 billion and $150 billion respectively after the bankruptcy of Lehman (Adrian, Burke and McAndrews 
2009). Auctions associated with the Single-Tranche Open Market Program were characterized by very high bid-to-
cover ratios (2.8 on average until August 2008). 
33 Wu (2010) also differs with respect to Taylor and Williams (2010) for a slightly different definition of banks’ 
counterparty risk (first principal component of a large set of CDS on both commercial and investment banks) and 
for the hypothesis that bank’s counterparty and liquidity risks might be correlated. 
34 Three factors – constant, slope and curvature – are used to model the dynamics of “risk-free” Treasury rates. Two 
more factors are used to capture the counterparty risk implicit in financial bonds and the last factor is used to 
measure the liquidity risk component of the Libor. According to Christensen et al. (2009) liquidity premia affect 
Libor rates and financial bonds’ yields in different ways because the holders of the latter class of assets have a 
higher tolerance than banks with regard to liquidity problems. Moreover, they also suggest that financial bond 
returns capture short-term credit risk more precisely than long-term bank CDS.   21
Fleming, Hrung and Keane (2010) assess the effectiveness of the Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF) focusing on the impact of the provision of Treasuries on the spread 
between Treasury repos and repos based on less liquid collateral. They regress repo rates and 
spreads on the amount of Treasuries made available through the TSLF programme taking into 
account the type of securities pledged as collateral and whether auctions were fully or under-
subscribed. The results suggest that the TSLF was effective in contrasting tensions in the 
secured funding market and, in particular, in satisfying market participants’ increased demand 
for Treasuries. According to one of the specifications presented in the paper, each extra billion 
of Treasuries provided through the TSLF reduced the “Agency debt-Treasury” and the “Agency 
MBS-Treasury” repo spreads by around 0.4 basis points on average. This implies an overall 
contraction of the spread of around 80 basis points.
35 The empirical analysis also shows that the 
effect of the TSLF on repo spreads was most noticeable in the case of fully subscribed 
operations, when the set of eligible collateral was broad and when the Treasury repo rate was far 
below the federal funds target rate. 
Hrung and Seligman (2011) extend the analysis of Fleming et al. (2010) by taking into 
account that the availability of Treasuries was also affected by the Supplemental Financing 
Program (SFP), by changes in Government issuance, by the TARP, and by Fed’s Open Market 
Operations (OMO). Their econometric analysis confirms that the impact of the TSLF on 
Treasury repo rates was significant (1 basis point for each billion of Treasuries made available 
to market participants) and that it was even larger during periods of intense market stress. 
Moreover, they also find that the TSLF was uniquely effective compared with other policies that 
influenced the availability of Treasuries and associate this evidence with the fact that TSLF 
operations were explicitly “directed” to dealers in the General Collateral repo market.  
Baba and Packer (2009) study the impact of Reciprocal Currency Agreements on the 
foreign exchange (FX) swap market between the US dollar and the euro, the Swiss franc and the 
pound sterling. They found that the programme was effective in improving FX swap market 
dislocations, especially from mid-October 2008, when the Fed uncapped the amount of dollar 
liquidity provided. Goldberg et al. (2010), reporting formal research as well as more descriptive 
accounts from market participants, also conclude that dollar swap lines were effective in 
reducing dollar funding pressures. 
Effects of the measures adopted by the ECB in the pre-Lehman phase 
The flexibility of its operational framework has allowed the ECB to cope with the first 
phase of the crisis by modifying its modus operandi only marginally. As a consequence, the 
recourse to unconventional measures has been limited and has not attracted the interest of 
empirical researchers.  
During this period the ECB made more frequent recourse to fine-tuning operations, 
accommodated banks’ desire to front-load the reserve requirement, increased the relative 
provision of long-term liquidity, and offered US dollar funding to Eurosystem counterparties. 
These measures had two main objectives. First, to keep very-short-term money market interest 
rates close to the official rate; second, to counteract tensions in the euro-area money market and 
in US dollar funding markets. While the effectiveness of the ECB in achieving the latter target 
cannot be assessed without a formal analysis, the observation that in the first phase of the crisis 
the Eonia remained close to the official interest rate suggests that the decisions adopted by the 
ECB were useful in combating the volatility of the euro-area overnight rate.  
                                                 
35 This effect was mainly due to an increase in Treasury repo rates, evidence that confirms that the TSLF was 
effective in addressing the shortage of government bonds and in contrasting the emergence of settlement problems 
in the repo market.   22
Table 3: Measures adopted by the Fed in the pre-Lehman phase: effects on financial variables 
Paper  Programme 
evaluated  Methodology  Variable of interest  Results  Notes 
Taylor and Williams 
(2010)  TAF  Event study  Libor-OIS spread  No significant impact on the 
Libor-OIS spread 
Dependent variable in 
levels; TAF dummy 
 equal to one on 
announcement days 
McAndrews, Sarkar 
and Wang (2008)  TAF Event  study  First-difference of the 
Libor- OIS spread 
50 bp reduction in the Libor-
OIS spread; both 
announcement and 
implementation effective 
Dependent variable in 
differences; TAF 
dummy  equal to one 
on announcement and 
implementation days 
Wu (2010)  TAF  Event study  Libor-OIS spread  50 bp reduction in the Libor-
OIS spread  
Dependent variable in 
levels; TAF dummy 














70 bp reduction in the 
liquidity risk component of 
the 3-month Libor  
 - 
Thornton (2010)  TAF  Event study  Ted spread  No effect on liquidity 
premium in the Libor market   - 
Fleming, Hrung and 
Keane (2010)  TSLF OLS  regression 
Levels of repo rates 
and spread between 
Treasury repos and 
repos based on other 
less liquid collateral 
0.4 bp reduction in Agency 
Debt-Treasury and Agency 
MBS-Treasury repo spreads 
for each extra billion of 
Treasury lent 
 - 
Hrung and Seligman 
(2011)  TSLF OLS  regression 
Spread between 
federal funds (both 
target and effective) 
and Treasury GC  
repos 
1 bp reduction in Spread 
between federal funds (both 
target and effective) and 
Treasury GC  repos for each 
billion of Treasury lent 
Interaction terms 
show that the impact 
of TSLF was larger 
during period of stress 
Baba and Packer 





Deviations from the 
covered interest parity 
in FX swap 
30 pb reduction in EUR/ 
USD FX swap deviations 
Sample period: Aug 
2007-Jan 2009 
Note: TAF = Term Auction Facility; TSFL = Term Securities Lending Facility; RCA = Reciprocal Currency Agreements. 
 
Effects of the measures adopted by the Fed in the post-Lehman phase 
In this section we describe the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the ABCP 
Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility, of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, of the Term 
ABS Loan Facility and of the purchase of Agency debt, Agency MBS and long-term government 
bonds.
36 
The objective of the ABCP Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) was to 
support the liquidity of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and to break the 
vicious circle between money market share redemptions and ABCP fire sales. Duygan-Bump, 
Parkinson, Rosengren, Suarez and Willen (2010) analyse both these aspects and conclude in 
favour of the effectiveness of this unconventional measure. In particular, using a diff-in-diff 
approach they show that, following the introduction of the AMLF, the reduction in redemptions 
was greater for those money market funds that owned a larger proportion of AMLF-eligible 
assets. Similarly, by comparing the yields on AMLF-eligible ABCP with those of otherwise 
equivalent AMLF-ineligible commercial paper they also conclude that the AMLF reduced the 
liquidity risk component of the former by around 80 basis points.
37 
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) provided a temporary liquidity back-
stop to issuers of commercial paper and was intended, in particular, to limit investors’ and 
borrowers’ concerns about “roll-over risk”. Anderson and Gascon (2009) and Adrian, 
                                                 
36 See page 10 and Table 1. 
37 This analysis is based on the impact of the AMLF on the spread between returns on AMLF-eligible ABCP with 
those of the unsecured commercial paper issued by the sponsor of the same ABCP programme, which should be 
characterized by a similar credit risk.   23
Kimbrough and Marchioni (2010) observe that the heavy recourse to this facility and the fact 
that the implementation of the programme has prompted a significant increase in term 
commercial paper issuance and a sharp reduction in commercial paper spreads tend to support 
its effectiveness.
38 
A statistical assessment of the effects of the CPFF is provided by Duca (2011). He 
employs a VECM methodology to study the determinants of the relative use of bank loans and 
of debt funded by commercial paper by US firms since the early 1960s. He finds that up until 
the adoption of the CPFF, when corporate spreads rose, the use of commercial paper fell relative 
to bank loans, which could be funded with insured deposits. However, the fact that this link 
broke down after the implementation of the CPFF suggests that this measure may have 
prevented an even sharper fall in commercial paper.  
With the Term ABS Loan Facility (TALF) the Fed provided investors with long-term 
loans for the purchase of newly issued high-quality ABS backed by consumer and small 
business loans and commercial mortgages. Agarwal et al. (2010) offer an extensive description 
of the ABS market and observe that the implementation of the programme was quickly followed 
by a recovery in ABS issuance and a reduction in the spreads between AAA-rated ABS and 
interest rate swaps of the order of 200-300 basis points. 
Campbell et al. (2011) provide a more formal assessment of the effectiveness of the 
TALF with an event study approach. Their analysis is based on two assumptions. First, the 
announcements concerning the programme were unexpected. Second, they also postulate that, 
without the TALF the spreads between eligible ABS and broader financial market returns would 
have remained unchanged. Under these two assumptions, they study the dynamics of these ABS 
spreads in periods around TALF announcements, using both market and security level data. The 
analysis based on market level data suggests that the programme was effective. In particular, 
they find that the announcements led to a reduction in ABS and in CMBS spreads by, 
respectively, 10-60 and 50-150 basis points. The analysis based on security level data fails to 
find specific effects on ABS returns associated with its acceptance or rejection in the 
programme. The authors interpret this last evidence as suggesting that the TALF programme has 
affected overall market conditions for high-rate ABS without providing advantages to specific 
securities.  
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of the Large-Scale Asset Purchases of Agency 
debt and Agency MBS. Stroebel and Taylor (2009) analyse the effect of the MBS purchases by 
the Treasury and the Fed with an event study methodology. In particular, they regress a measure 
of MBS spreads which controls for prepayment risk on different measures of credit-default risk 
of the underlying mortgages, on the percentage of outstanding MBS purchased at each point of 
the programme, and on a series of dummies that are intended to capture the effects of the 
announcements of the programme. Even if the results are somehow conflicting, they tend to 
suggest that the announcements concerning purchases in the secondary market had some effect 
and contributed to reduce spreads by around 30- 60 basis points. At the same time, they fail to 
find a relationship between the size of the purchases and the change in MBS spreads.
39  
The empirical pricing model adopted by Hancock and Passmore (2011) assumes that 
MBS yields are determined by long-term swap rates, a short-term spread between swaps and 
Treasuries, and a series of risk premia. The authors estimate this equation with pre-crisis data 
and use the estimated parameters to provide an out-of-sample assessment of the effects of the 
                                                 
38 During the first quarter of implementation of the CPFF the spread associated with A2/P2 commercial paper, 
which was not eligible for the CPFF, remained substantially stable at around 500 basis points while the spreads of 
CPFF-eligible securities shrank from more than 200 to around 50-100 basis points. 
39 Since the Fed pre-announced both the size and the pace of the purchases, this evidence is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the size might also matter since the markets are likely to front-load the effects.   24
crisis on MBS yields. They are able to show that after the announcement of the MBS purchase 
programme the gap between actual yields on MBS and those predicted using parameters based 
on the pre-crisis sample (around 50 basis points) progressively shrank and, by the end of the first 
quarter of 2009, vanished completely. This evidence therefore suggests that the Fed’s 
intervention improved the functioning of the MBS market. 
Fuster and Willen (2010) apply an event study methodology on individual level 
mortgage data to assess the impact of the announcements concerning the purchase of Agency 
debt and MBS on the characteristics of newly issued mortgage loans and on the selection of the 
borrowers that apply for a mortgage. They find three main results. First, both the initial 
announcement and the subsequent changes to the programme led to significant reductions in the 
interest rates paid by borrowers. These reductions, however, were heterogeneous across 
mortgage contracts. Second, the intervention of the Fed coincided with a significant increase in 
borrowing activity, mainly for refinancing purposes as opposed to purchases of new houses. 
Third, the MBS programme generated a significant shift in borrowers’ characteristics. In 
particular, refinancing activity became highly skewed towards borrowers with high credit 
scores. The authors conclude that the Agency debt and MBS purchase programme had a large 
effect on mortgage prices and jump-started activity in the primary market. Moreover, they also 
observe that the almost immediate market response to the announcement of the programme 
suggests that the effectiveness of this measure is not subject to “long and variable lags”, as is the 
case with other consumer-targeted policies such as tax cuts.  
  We now focus on the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Large-Scale Asset 
Purchases of Treasuries in lowering long-term interest rates. This issue was addressed in the 
literature even before the recent crisis, with largely inconclusive results. Early studies found that 
open market operations had very little impact on yields, supporting the view that the price of an 
asset does not depend on its relative supply. The most influential paper is that of Modigliani and 
Sutch (1967) on the effect of Operation Twist, the joint intervention in the government bond 
market by the Fed and the Treasury in 1961 aimed at reducing long-term interest rates while 
keeping short-term rates constant.
40 Their main finding is that the impact on term spreads is, at 
most, very modest. On the contrary, more recent analyses, such as Bernanke, Reihnart and Sack 
(2004), provide more optimistic results regarding the effectiveness of debt management 
operations. The Fed’s purchases of Treasuries during the recent crisis spurred a series of new 
analyses. We classify these studies in two groups according to whether they adopt an event 
study approach or a more structural time series analysis. In the first group of studies, Gagnon et 
al. (2010) find that around the main announcements of QE1 10-year Treasury interest rates 
recorded a cumulative drop of about 90 basis points. The same result is documented by Yellen 
(2011b), who analyses a slightly different set of events. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011) provide results for both QE1 and QE2, showing that Treasury and Agency debt yields 
displayed a cumulative reduction of more than 100 basis points in QE1 and around 20 points in 
QE2. The large difference between the responses in these two episodes suggests that there may 
be some factors, such as market conditions, liquidity or market expectations, which are not 
properly taken into account by this kind of study. Swanson (2011) provides estimates of the 
effects of QE2 by studying Operation Twist considering that the size of this programme as a 
fraction of the Treasury debt is comparable to that of QE2. His results suggest that the 
cumulative effect on 10-year Treasury yields would be around 15 basis points.
41  
                                                 
40 Operation Twist was a quantitative policy in which the Fed purchased longer-term government notes while 
maintaining its official rate constant and the Treasury reduced the issuance of longer-term notes in favour of short-
term securities. 
41 The fairness of this comparison is arguable as the ample difference between estimates of QE1 and QE2 in 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) suggests that the size of the purchase programme is not the only 
variable that is relevant to their effectiveness. In particular, financial strains and low liquidity at the time of the   25
The second group of studies uses time series methods, which require selecting stronger 
assumptions on the data. If causal links are properly identified, those methods allow the 
researcher to perform policy experiments. Overall, these studies tend to find that the Fed’s 
purchases have a significant effect on Treasury yields. In particular, a purchase of $400 billion 
of long-term securities sterilized with an equivalent issuance of short-term notes would reduce 
10-year Treasury yields by between 14 and 67 basis points.
42  
The lowest value of this range is found by Hamilton and Wu (2010) using a model based 
on the “preferred habitat” theory as in Vayanos and Vila (2009). They show that their results 
hold even when the short-term rates are at the zero lower bound and the sterilization becomes 
irrelevant. Gagnon et al. (2010) find similar results adopting a model that explains 10-year term 
spread using business cycle indicators, measures of uncertainty about economic fundamentals, 
and the net public sector supply of Treasury bonds. Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) find a 
positive correlation between the maturity structure of US government debt and the associated 
interest rate term structure. According to their analysis a purchase of $400 billion of Treasury 
bonds would reduce long-term rates by around 40 basis points. The highest value of the range is 
found by D’Amico and King (2010) using data from a panel of yields at different maturities in 
the period in which QE1 was ongoing (March-October 2009).  
The findings of both groups of studies must be interpreted with caution. Results from 
event studies are based on the hypothesis that announcements/actions are not anticipated, they 
are conditional on the specific market conditions on the day of the announcement, they usually 
rely on a small number of data points and, finally, they might be strongly affected by the choice 
of events that are included in the sample and by the hypothesis on the responsiveness of 
financial markets to news, i.e. the window over which changes are computed. Furthermore, even 
though high-frequency event studies allow measuring the correlation between changes in the 
supply of financial assets and variations in financial prices in a straightforward way, a causal 
interpretation is correct only insofar as policy announcements or actions are not a response to 
market conditions on that day. This note of caution is even more relevant when the analysis is 
based on time series data with a monthly or even lower frequency: since the supply of 
government bonds is influenced by the interest rate structure, the identification of the link of 
causality from the former to the latter requires strong and perhaps arguable hypotheses.  
Summing up, the evidence on the effectiveness of purchases of Treasury bonds in 
lowering long-term interest rates suggests that central banks have some power, although 
considerable uncertainty still surrounds the exact quantification of the impact.  
The evidence on the ability of the Fed to use communication to control market 
expectations about future short-term and, in turn, long-term interest rates is scant. According to 
Yellen (2011a), the statements of the December 2008 and January 2009 FOMC meetings 
suggesting that short-term rates would remain low “for some time” favoured a decline in market 
expectations about the one-year-ahead federal funds rate by about 90 basis points.  
Courtois, Haltom and Hatchondo (2011) explore the possibility that the effectiveness of 
forward guidance could be enhanced by asset purchases which transmit information about the 
likelihood of policy interest rates remaining low for a long time. They find some evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. However, they also observe that the exact magnitude of the effect 
cannot be accurately evaluated as the announcement might also influence the risk premium 
implicit in financial assets from which market expectations are extracted. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
operations as well as the zero lower bound on the short-term interest rates are other important factors that could 
influence the effectiveness of purchase programmes. 
42 This is the experiment proposed by Hamilton and Wu (2010).   26














Spread between returns on 
ABCP of a given issuer and 
the returns of the unsecured 
commercial paper issued by 
the sponsor of the same 
ABCP programme 
Reduction of about 80 bp in the 
yields on ABCP   - 
Duca (2010)  CPFF  VEC model; linear 
regressions 
Commercial paper – bank 
loan mix 
Implementation of the CPFF 
coincided with a break in the 
relationship between the 
“commercial paper – bank loan 
mix” and the corporate - 
Treasury bond spread. 
- 
Campbell, Covitz, 
Nelson and Pence 
(2011) 
TALF Event  study 
Spreads of the ABS that 
were eligible for the TALF 
and spreads on broad market 
indices 
Reduction of 10-60 bp in 
spreads of highly rated ABS 
after announcement in March 
2009  
- 







Event study  MBS spread 
Reduction of 30-60 bp in 
spreads on secondary markets 
after announcement of LSAP.  
Results are conflicting 
across specifications 











MBS yields, mortgage rates 
Reduction of about 50 bp in 
undue risk premia in MBS 
yields. The gap between actual 
MBS yields and 
“counterfactual” projections 
based on pre-crisis data 
disappears by 2009-q1 
- 







Event study based 




Effects on price and 
quantities of US primary 
mortgage market 
Boost in market activity (mainly 
refinancing); significant 
reductions in mortgage rate for 
high-quality borrowers 
- 





changes in yields 
in the days of 
announcement 
2 yr- and 10-yr Treasury 
yields, 10-yr agency debt 
yield, 10-yr swap rate Baa 
corporate bond index yield 
Change in 10-yr Treasury 
yields: -91 bp 
Sample period: 
Nov 2008 - Nov 2009 
Yellen (2011b)  LSAP 
Treasuries 
Event study; 
changes in yields 
on the days of 
announcement 
10-yr and 30-yr yields on 
Treasuries, TIPS, MBS and 
corporate bond yields 
Change in 10-yr Treasury 
yields: -107 bp 
Sample period: 








changes in yields 
on the days of 
announcement 
Treasury yields at various 
maturities, agency debt, 
MBS corporate yields & 
TIPS 
Change in 10-yr Treasury 
yields:-100 (QE1);  -30 (QE2) 
 
Sample period: 
Nov 2008 - Mar 2009; 




Treasuries  Event study  10-yr Treasury yields  Change in 10-yr Treasury 
yields: -16 bp 
Sample period: 
1961-1962 




Treasuries  Times series study  10-yr Treasury yields 
 
Following Fed purchase of 
$400bn of long-term Treasury 
securities and equivalent sale of 
short-term notes 10 yrs Treasury 
yields drop by 14 bp 
Sample period: 
1990-2007 
Gagnon et al. (2010) 
 
LSAP 
Treasuries   Times series study 
Term premium on 10-yr 
Treasury yields 
 
Impact on 10-yr Treasury yields 
following a 1% drop in the net 
supply of long-term government 
bonds over GDP: between -7 
and  -10 bp 
Sample period: 





Treasuries   Times series study 
Treasury spreads: 5-yr over 
1-yt and 20-yt over 1-yt 
 
Following Fed purchase of 
$400bn in long-term Treasury 
securities and equivalent sale of 
short-term notes 5 over 1-yr 
spread (20 over 1-yr spreads) 
drops by 39 (74 bp) 
Sample period: 
1952-2006 




Treasuries  Panel data study  10-yr Treasury yields  Fed purchases $400bn in long-
term Treasuries: -67 bp 
Sample period: 
Mar 2009 – Oct 2009 
Note: AMLF =ABCP Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility; TSFL= Term Securities Lending Facility; CPFF = Commercial Paper Funding Facility; 
TALF = Term ABS Loan Facility; LSAP Treasuries = Large-scale asset purchases of Treasuries. 
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Effects of the measures adopted by the ECB in the post-Lehman phase 
The evidence on the effectiveness of the unconventional measures adopted by the ECB is 
scarcer than for the US. Abbassi and Linzert (2011) analyze the evolution of Euribor rates at 
various maturities before and after August 2007. They show that between 2004 and mid-2007, 
their dynamics were determined to a large extent by future expectations about the overnight rate 
and they were not affected by the amount of outstanding liquidity. On the contrary after the 
outburst of the crisis, and in particular after the bankruptcy of Lehman, Euribor rates became 
sensitive to outstanding liquidity. According to their estimates the average increase in the 
outstanding liquidity offered by the Eurosystem (60% more than in the period 2004-2007) 
reduced the Euribor rates by around 100 bp. Moreover they also show that the announcement of 
the introduction of 12-month long-term refinancing operations had a further, although modest, 
downward effect on the 12-month Euribor. 
Angelini, Nobili and Piccillo (2011) employ a panel data analysis based on individual 
bank data and exchange-level information on interbank loans. The main objective of their 
research is to verify if, after the outburst of the financial turmoil in August 2007, banks have 
become more reactive to borrowers’ characteristics. They also provide an assessment of the 
effect of the adoption of the Fixed-Rate Full-Allotment procedure (FRFA) on money market 
rates. Their findings suggest that only the announcements related with the 1- and 3-month 
refinancing operations had a positive impact on market conditions, reducing the spread between 
interest rates on unsecured and secured loans by about 10-20 basis points. This evidence does 
not necessarily points toward a limited effect of the FRFA procedure since its first-order impact 
is likely to have been on the level of both secured and unsecured interbank interest rates. 
Beirne et al. (2011) analyze the effects of the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
(CBPP) on the issuance and on the yields of covered bonds. Using an extensive set of analytical 
approaches which includes event studies, cointegration analysis and linear regressions they find 
that the implementation of the CBPP had a positive impact on the outstanding amount of 
covered bonds. However the more muted impact on the overall amount of both covered and 
uncovered bond suggests a possible crowding out effect between these two classes of financial 
assets. The CBPP is also shown to have had a positive effect on secondary markets: in the 
second half of 2009 the spreads between the yields on covered and agency bonds in Germany 
and France fell by around 50 bp and even larger declines were observed in other countries of the 
euro area. A more formal linear regression analysis, which takes into account the effects of the 
sovereign crisis and of other factors, confirms this evidence, although suggesting a more limited 
impact on the spreads (between 10 and 20 bp).  
There is yet no available econometric analysis on the effectiveness of the Securities 
Markets Programme (SMP). Anecdotal evidence and market participants’ reports suggest that 
this programme has contributed to prevent a potential market meltdown in May 2010 and that it 
has been effective in addressing the severe dislocations that were spiralling out of control at that 
time. The identification and the exact quantification of the effects of the SMP, however, is 
prevented by the fact that its announcement coincided with the Ecofin decision to start a 
comprehensive package of measures (including the EFSF and the EFSM) aimed at assisting EU 
Member States under financial stress. Immediately after resuming the SMP in August 2011, the 
yields on government bonds of Italy and Spain dropped dramatically; afterwards, they 
stabilized, but on a relatively high level. It is too early to provide a robust evaluation of the 
effects of the purchases. 
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Table 5: Measures adopted by the ECB in the post-Lehman phase: effects on financial variables 
Paper  Program 






Event study; OLS 
regressions  Euribor rates 
100 bp reduction in Euribor rates; significant 
(but limited) impact of the announcement of 








Panel data study based on 
interest rates on actual 
unsecured interbank loans 
(E-Mid)   
Spread between 
unsecured and secured 
interbank loans  
 Around 10-20 bp reduction in the interbank 
spreads  
Beirne et al. 
(2011)  CBPP 
Event study, cointegration 
analysis and linear 
regressions 
Issuance of covered 
bonds; spread between 
convered and agency 
bonds 
Positive impact on the issuance of covered 
bonds; crowding out of uncovered bonds; 
around 10-20 bp reduction of the spread 
between covered and agency bonds  
Note: FRFA =Fixed rate full allotment in refinancing operations; CBPP = Covered Bonds Purchase Program. 
 
4.2 Effects of the unconventional measures on macroeconomic variables  
This section reviews the evidence on the effects on output, inflation and other relevant 
macroeconomic variables of the unconventional monetary policy measures put in place by the 
Fed and by the ECB during the recent crisis. 
Ideally, in order to gauge the effectiveness of unconventional measures, one would like 
to answer the question “what would have happened to output and inflation had the 
unconventional monetary policy measures not been introduced?”. Providing a convincing 
answer to such question is at best very difficult. For this reason the literature has generally tried 
to answer the related, but easier, question “what is the effect on output and inflation of a 
reduction in the long-term interest rates or credit spreads due to unconventional measures?”.  
Most of the studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of the non-traditional 
measures adopt as a starting point of their analysis specific point estimates obtained from one of 
the papers presented in Section 4.1 or from narrative evidence. The channels through which the 
reduction in interest rates propagates to the real activity and prices are the usual ones: reduced 
borrowing costs that stimulate the investment and spending decisions; higher stock valuations 
that have positive wealth effects; depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which stimulates 
the export sector. So, in principle, the transmission mechanism is apparently not very different 
from the one of a more conventional reduction in short-term rates.  
The studies on the macroeconomic effects follow two approaches: VAR analysis, which 
imposes little structure on the data, and more structural models, such as medium-scale DSGE 
model or central banks’ large-scale econometric models. Baumeister and Benati (2010) estimate 
a structural time-varying VAR and identify a “pure spread shock”, which increases the long-
term rates without affecting the short-term ones. They find that this type of shock has important 
effects on real activity and prices in several industrialized countries. Using the estimates by 
Gagnon et al. (2010) of the effects of LSAP program on the term premia in the US, they analyse 
the dynamics of output and inflation had the reduction in the term spread not happened. They 
claim that central bank’s purchases have prevented a large deflation and a strong collapse of 
output. According to their median estimates, GDP would have contracted by 10% in the first 
quarter of 2009 and inflation would have likely remained negative in most of 2009.  
Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010) adopt a similar approach to evaluate the impact of 
unconventional measures on the euro area economy. They estimate a large Bayesian VAR and 
assume that the reduction in the spread between unsecured and secured money market rates 
observed between November 2008 and August 2009 was entirely due to the non-standard 
measures of the ECB. By comparing the forecasts of the main macro variables conditional on 
the observed path of money market spreads and a no-policy scenario in which the spreads 
remained constant at the level of October 2008, they conclude that in the absence of the ECB 
intervention credit dynamics would have been much more depressed. According to their   29
estimates the growth rate of industrial production would have been 3 percentage points lower at 
mid-2010 and inflation would have been about 0.5 percentage point lower at the beginning of 
2010. Some caution is required in interpreting these results, as the authors assume that after 
2007 the coefficients of the reduced form representation have not changed.
43 Moreover, the no-
policy scenario is constructed assuming that the entire reduction of the spread is attributable to 
unconventional measures, which may be questionable (at the same time the ECB cut decisively 
the official rates and government interventions were undertaken). 
In a more recent paper, Giannoni, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2011), compare the actual 
dynamics of monetary and credit variables during the financial crisis with their forecasts 
(conditional on industrial production) obtained from a Bayesian VAR estimated on the pre-crisis 
data. The authors find that the prediction errors for some of these variables are statistically not 
significant and interpret this result as evidence of the success of the non-standard measures in 
insulating monetary and credit aggregates from the impact of the financial crisis. 
Peersman (2011) uses a structural VAR to provide some stylized facts about the 
transmission of unconventional interventions in the euro area. The author defines an innovation 
to bank credit as an “unconventional monetary policy shock”. The assumption is that ECB 
unconventional measures were able to boost bank credit volumes, through changes of the size 
and composition of its balance sheet. According to the evidence presented in the paper the 
transmission of the “unconventional” monetary shock has the same features of the transmission 
of standard monetary shock, namely a hump-shaped response of output and a permanent, but 
delayed, response of prices, although the propagation is in general more sluggish.  
A second group of papers study the macroeconomic effects of unconventional measures 
using general equilibrium structural models. The main advantage of this approach is that a 
proper counterfactual can be constructed more easily without incurring in the Lucas’ critique. 
The drawback is that these models are more difficult to estimate. Del Negro et al. (2010) build a 
fully-fledged DSGE model, including financial frictions à la Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). 
Calibrating this model to match features of the US economy, they find that the extraordinary 
monetary policy intervention of the Fed, that in the model is constructed as a swap of liquid for 
illiquid assets (the portfolio-balance channel), prevented a major collapse in output and the risk 
of persistent deflation. According to their model, this policy measure is especially effective 
when the economy reaches the zero lower bound.   
 Chung  et al. (2011) measure the impact of the LSAP program using the FRB/US model, 
augmented to analyze portfolio-balance channel effects. The term premium in the model is 
assumed to be proportional to the discounted future expected Fed holdings of long-term 
securities as a ratio of nominal GDP. The model simulations have the advantage of considering 
not only the initial impact of the asset purchases but also the effects of the evolution of the 
program. They show that the LSAP program boosts output by almost 3% above the baseline in 
the second half of 2012, raises employment by about 3 million jobs and keeps inflation about 1 
percentage point higher than in the no-intervention scenario. According to the model, this would 
have corresponded to a reduction in the federal funds rate, relative to the baseline, of about 300 
basis points relative since early 2009.  
  Fuhrer and Olivei (2011) assume that the reduction in US long-term interest rates due to 
QE2 is quantifiable at around 20-30 basis points (as found in Gagnon et al., 2010 and  Hamilton 
and Wu, 2010) and estimate its effect on real GDP and unemployment. Combining information 
from a VAR, the Boston Fed and the FRB/US models, they find that the implied increase in real 
                                                 
43 This is difficult to justify given the depth and strength of the financial crisis and the global recession observed in 
the following years.   30
GDP is around 60-90 basis points over two years, while the drop in the unemployment rate over 
the same period is slightly less than half a percentage point. 
Some papers have focused on the effects of the unconventional measures on specific 
euro-area countries. Locarno and Secchi (2009) provide an assessment regarding the Italian 
economy. Their results suggest that the abundant provision of liquidity in the euro area reduced 
the spread between unsecured and secured interbank rates by around 100 basis points and that 
this reduction was reflected in a similar decline in Italian short-term lending rates. The authors 
measure the impact of this interest rate change on output growth by means of the Bank of Italy 
Quarterly Model and conclude that the non-standard decisions of the ECB prevented a further 
decline of around 1 per cent in Italian output (cumulative over the three years 2008-2010). 
Given the evidence of some credit rationing during the crisis, they also observe that an 
assessment of the impact of the unconventional measures that neglected the effects on credit 
availability would significantly underestimate their importance.
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Table 6: Effects of the unconventional measures on macroeconomic variables 
Macroeconomic effect  Paper  Country  Methodology  Description of the exercise 





US  Structural time-
varying VAR 
Identification of a "pure 
spread" shock (i.e. a shock that 
affects the long-term rate 
leaving the short-term rate 
unchanged). Simulation of the 
effects of the reduction in the 
spread estimated by Gagnon et 
al. (2010) on some 
macroeconomic variables. 
GDP would have 
contracted by 





Euro area  Large Bayesian 
VAR 
Comparisons of conditional 
forecasts of some 
macroeconomic variables in 
the case in which the spreads 
between unsecured and secured 
money market interest rates 




have been 3 pp 
lower in mid-
2010 
Inflation would have 
been 0.5 pp lower at 





been 3 pp lower 
in mid-2009 
Peersman 
(2011)  Euro area  Structural VAR 
Identification of 
"unconventional monetary 
policy shocks" as innovations 
to bank credit orthogonal to 
monetary policy. Analysis of 













delayed response of 
prices. More sluggish 
propagation compared 









US  Calibrated DSGE 
model 
Large-scale DSGE model with 
financial frictions. Assessment 
of the macroeconomic effects 
of a swap of liquid for illiquid 
assets by the central bank with 
and without the zero lower 
bound. 
Output about 5 
pp lower (in 
deviation from 
the baseline) after 
the shock 
Inflation about 5 pp 
lower (in deviation 
from the baseline) 
after the shock 
- 
Chung et al. 
(2011)  US FRB/US  model 
Simulation of the 
macroeconomic effects of 
central bank asset purchases in 
the large-scale macro-
econometric model used at the 
Federal Reserve Board 
augmented with a term 
premium that depends on the 
net supply of assets. 
Real GDP is 
boosted by 
almost 3% above 
the baseline in 
the second half of 
2012 











VAR, Boston Fed 
and FRB/US 
models 
Study of the effects of 
purchases of $600 bn of long-
term Treasuries 
Real GDP should 
rise by 60-90 bp 







45 bp over the 
two years. 
                                                 
44 On the effects of credit rationing on the Italian economy during the recent crisis, see also Caivano et al. (2010) 
and Gaiotti (2011).   31
Summing up, the research on the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary 
policy suggests that the interventions of the Fed and the ECB were crucial in avoiding a collapse 
in output and the threat of deflation. Although we share this general conclusion, in our view the 
magnitude of the stimulus is subject to large uncertainty, both on the upside and on the 
downside, for four reasons.  
First, most results are based on estimates of the impact of the unconventional measures 
on long-term interest rates that are still very uncertain. Second, in most cases they are based on 
the assumption that the global crisis had no effect on the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables; this need not be the case, as uncertainty and loss of confidence could severely impair 
the normal functioning of the economy. Third, studies of the macroeconomic effects of 
unconventional measures that focus exclusively on their impact transmitted through financial 
prices (such as market spreads) may underestimate the overall effectiveness of the interventions 
in presence of credit rationing: they do not capture the possible benefits in terms of greater 
availability of credit and liquidity in the economy. Finally, most of models used do not feature a 
fully fledged financial system, which is necessary to make a sound inference about the effects of 
the unconventional measures.  
5. Conclusions 
 
The Fed and the ECB implemented a series of unconventional monetary measures aimed 
at avoiding a meltdown of the financial system and mitigating the effects of the turmoil on the 
real economy and on prices. The Fed modified its operational framework on many levels; the 
innovations implemented by the ECB were also substantial, but somehow less pervasive, due to 
a series of factors. First, the operational framework of the ECB was already very flexible before 
the crisis and therefore only modest modifications were needed. Second, in the US, capital 
markets play a more important role in providing credit to the economy than in the euro area. 
This implies that while the ECB could limit its efforts to improving and expanding the provision 
of funds to the banking system, the Fed had to resort to more innovative measures with broader 
scope. Third, in the US the impact of the crisis on the inflation outlook was more acute. This led 
the Fed to slash official interest rates to zero and to start a programme of asset purchases to 
reduce long-term yields and so provide further stimulus to the economy and avoid a deflation 
spiral. The difference in the size and scope of the unconventional measures adopted by the two 
central banks is reflected in the larger increase in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and in the 
more noticeable changes in its composition. 
A deeper understanding of the relative role of the different unconventional measures in 
preventing disruptions and in restoring normal conditions in financial markets is a crucial 
ingredient for the selection of the instruments that should be included in the central banks’ crisis 
toolbox. In this respect, the analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the functioning of these 
measures and of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of each of the specific 
unconventional measures adopted by the Fed and by the ECB can be of great help.  
The literature suggests that unconventional interventions may affect economic variables 
through two channels of transmission: the signalling channel and the portfolio-balance channel. 
The first is activated through communication and allows the central bank to restore confidence 
in the financial markets and to influence private expectations about future policy decisions and, 
in turn, long-term interest rates. The second operates when assets, and liabilities, in the balance 
sheets of the private sector are imperfectly substitutable. In such a situation the central bank 
might resort to asset purchases and liquidity injections to influence the prices of a wide set of 
securities and to mitigate the impact of financial frictions on funding conditions.   32
The review of the existing empirical literature on the unconventional measures put in 
place by the Fed and the ECB since August 2007, and up to mid-2011, leads to the following 
considerations. First, as far as concerns the effects on financial market conditions, the available 
evidence suggests that most of the unconventional measures adopted by the Fed and the ECB 
have been effective: in some cases, the estimated effects are sizeable. In the US the adoption of 
the TSLF was helpful in counteracting the limited availability of Treasuries and coincided with 
a decline in the spread between Treasury repos and Agency MBS repos of around 80 basis 
points; a similar effect was exerted by the AMLF on the yields on asset-backed commercial 
paper; an even larger impact on ABS yields (around 200-300 basis points) is associated with the 
implementation of the TALF. As regards the effects of purchases of long-term Treasury bonds 
in the first round of quantitative easing, the estimates, based on time series models, suggest that 
long-term interest rates decreased by about 30-150 basis points. In the euro area the ECB’s 
decision to provide liquidity to the banking system using an FRFA procedure is estimated to 
have reduced Euribor rates by around 100 bp, while the CBPP is estimated to have decreased the 
covered bond spreads by about 10-50 basis points. 
Second, the degree of uncertainty that surrounds these results is very large, however. For 
example, the measurement of the effectiveness of the TAF in reducing the Libor-OIS spread 
ranges from zero to around 70 basis points depending on the econometric approach and on the 
specific variables adopted in the analysis. A similar range is observable in the measurement of 
the effects of the purchases of Treasuries on long-term interest rates (from 10 to more than 100 
basis points). These differences are due to a large degree of heterogeneity in the selection of the 
variables used in the analysis and in the identification techniques. Further research is needed to 
better understand: (i) the determinants of the various risk premia that affect the returns on 
financial assets (e.g. counterparty, liquidity, term, etc.); (ii) how they are intertwined in normal 
times and during periods of financial stress; and (iii) how they can be influenced by 
unconventional measures of monetary policy. The availability of more sound theoretical 
underpinnings would help in the selection of the proxies for the risk premia and in the design of 
the appropriate econometric methodology. The classification of the transmission channels of 
unconventional measures, as illustrated in the first part of the paper, is a step in this direction, 
but further analysis is necessary. 
Third, the available evidence on the macroeconomic effects suggests that the 
interventions of the Fed and the ECB were crucial in avoiding a larger collapse in output, 
persistent deflation and in sustaining credit growth. Still, the magnitude of the stimulus is very 
uncertain for four reasons. First, most macroeconomic results are inferred from very uncertain 
estimates of the impact of the unconventional measures on long-term interest rates. Second, they 
are based on the assumption that the crisis had no effect on the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables. Third, the existing studies may underestimate the effectiveness of the 
interventions because they do not fully capture the role of the unconventional measures in 
contrasting forms of credit rationing. Finally, the models used in the analyses generally lack a 
fully-fledged description of the financial system.  
To sum up, the available evidence suggests that the central banks interventions were 
effective; they avoided a financial meltdown, in the presence of an impaired monetary 
transmission mechanism and, in the case of the Fed, a binding zero lower bound for interest 
rates. However, a definite assessment of the overall benefits and costs of unconventional 
measures is not yet possible. A fundamental issue, that is not addressed in this paper but is 
crucial to a comprehensive evaluation of the whole policy experiment, is the costs that central 
banks may incur to reverse their unconventional policies. It remains an issue to measure, and 
minimize, the distortions associated with prolonged use of non-market-based liquidity provision 
mechanisms; in the longer term, the withdrawal of those operations that have permanent effects 
on the central banks’ balance sheets may pose some challenges.   33
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